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Abstract
Background: Public health recommendations are usually based on a mixture of empirical evidence and normative
arguments: to argue that authorities ought to implement an intervention that has proven effective in improving
people’s health requires a normative position confirming that the authorities are responsible for improving people’s
health. While public health (at the national level) is based on a widely accepted normative starting point – namely,
that it is the responsibility of the state to improve people’s health – there is no widely accepted normative starting
point for international health or global health. As global health recommendations may vary depending on the
normative starting point one uses, global health research requires a better dialogue between researchers who are
trained in empirical disciplines and researchers who are trained in normative disciplines.
Discussion: Global health researchers with a background in empirical disciplines seem reluctant to clarify the
normative starting point they use, perhaps because normative statements cannot be derived directly from empirical
evidence, or because there is a wide gap between present policies and the normative starting point they personally
support. Global health researchers with a background in normative disciplines usually do not present their work in
ways that help their colleagues with a background in empirical disciplines to distinguish between what is merely
personal opinion and professional opinion based on rigorous normative research.
If global health researchers with a background in empirical disciplines clarified their normative starting point, their
recommendations would become more useful for their colleagues with a background in normative disciplines. If
global health researchers who focus on normative issues used adapted qualitative research guidelines to present
their results, their findings would be more useful for their colleagues with a background in empirical disciplines.
Summary: Although a single common paradigm for all scientific disciplines that contribute to global health
research may not be possible or desirable, global health researchers with a background in empirical disciplines and
global health researchers with a background in normative disciplines could present their ‘truths’ in ways that would
improve dialogue. This paper calls for an exchange of views between global health researchers and editors of
medical journals.
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Background
Empirical versus normative disciplines and the ‘is-ought
problem’
More than a century ago, Sabine wrote: “The general
division of sciences into descriptive and normative has
long been one of the commonest devices used in classifica-
tion, so much that it has become almost traditional to refer
to it even in the elementary text-books of logic and ethics”
[1], page 433. Descriptive sciences, according to Sabine,
“attempt merely to state what is” [1], page 433, emphasis
in original. Normative sciences “are said to state not what
is but what ought to be” [1], page 433, emphasis in original.
A century later, the division of sciences into descriptive
and normative is no longer customary. We all understand
that few sciences can be classified as purely descriptive or
purely normative. Scientific work that attempts to under-
stand the world as it is usually has a direct or indirect
objective of improving the world, and is guided by at least
a vague idea of how the world should be. Scientific work
that focuses on the world as it should be is never entirely
divorced from the world as it is. But that understanding
has not resolved the (in) famous ‘is-ought problem’, the
problem for which Friedrich and colleagues warn: “it is
important to note that no empirical description of rela-
tionships between variables necessarily determines the
values one ought to pursue” [2], emphasis in original.
Many public health research papers do exactly what
Friedrich and colleagues warn for: they describe an empir-
ical relationship between variables – for example, the cor-
relation between availability of potable water and cases of
diarrhea – and move directly towards an ‘ought’ statement
– for example, that authorities ought to improve access to
potable water. The underlying assumption is that author-
ities ought to do what it takes to reduce cases of diarrhea.
Often, the underlying assumption is not controversial, and
therefore it seems unnecessary to mention it. At times,
however, the underlying assumption is controversial or
insufficient. Using the same example as above, in places
where potable water is very expensive to provide, and pro-
viding it may deplete scarce public resources that could be
used more efficiently, it is not self-evident that authorities
ought to provide potable water. And what if the majority
of a community has access to private sources of potable
water, and refuses to pay taxes to enable authorities pro-
viding water to the minority? Should democracy prevail in
such a situation?
The (is-ought) problem that I want to highlight with
these examples is that there is no empirical evidence for
the underlying normative assumptions that are frequently
used in public health. For Nozick, for example – who
argues that “[n]o state more extensive than the minimal
state can be justified” [3], page 297, and his minimal state
is not responsible for the health or general wellbeing of its
citizens, only for protection against violence, theft and
fraud – the state has no responsibility to provide potable
water, or healthcare, or education. One can argue that
Nozick’s position is ethically wrong, or perhaps in conflict
with national or international law, but it is quite impos-
sible to prove empirically that his position is false.
Global health: an interdisciplinary science, drawing on
empirical and normative disciplines
If we accept the definition of global health proposed by
Koplan and colleagues – namely: “global health is an area
for study, research, and practice that places a priority on
improving health and achieving equity in health for all
people worldwide” [4] – then Sabine would probably have
classified global health as a normative science: trying to
state what ought to be. But global health relies heavily on
empirical disciplines. As Koplan and colleagues argue:
“many disciplines, such as the social and behavioural sci-
ences, law, economics, history, engineering, biomedical
and environmental sciences, and public policy can make
great contributions to global health” [4].
Interdisciplinary scientific work comes with challenges.
Biomedical sciences, law, and ethics do not have a com-
mon epistemology. A lawyer’s ‘truth’ – or ‘justified belief ’
[5] – is of a different nature than a philosopher’s ‘truth’ or
a physician’s ‘truth’. For a lawyer, it is true that high-
income countries have a legal obligation to assist low-
income countries in providing healthcare, because there is
international law confirming that obligation, even in the
absence of empirical evidence of high-income countries
behaving as such. For some philosophers, high-income
countries would have this obligation even in the absence
of international law, because of the requirements of global
justice. For most physicians, however, a ‘truth’ is a valid
statement about something that is likely to occur under
given circumstances – for example, patients with certain
symptoms reacting to certain medicines in certain ways –
and if states do not really behave as lawyers or philoso-
phers argue they should, physicians will find it difficult to
consider the corresponding normative statements as
‘truths’.
To move from international to global health requires a
new normative starting point
Public health (at the national level) can rely on the widely
accepted assumption that “the national government is re-
sponsible for the health of the people”, as Rosen formulated
it [6], page 444. Obviously, this normative statement leaves
many normative questions unanswered – what level of
resources can the national government reasonably mobilize;
how should constrained resources be allocated? – but it
provides a starting point. Furthermore, as long as global
health was known (and practiced) as international health,
or in the words of Koplan and colleagues, as “health work
abroad, with a geographic focus on developing countries
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and often with a content of infectious and tropical diseases,
water and sanitation, malnutrition, and maternal and child
health” [4], the widely accepted normative starting point
according to which “the national government is responsible
for the health of the people” [6], page 444 was fit for
purpose – the purpose being reducing health inequalities
within ‘developing’ countries. But when international health
becomes global health, and tries to identify and address
global health inequities, the normative starting point of
public health no longer works.
To be clear, the World Health Organization (WHO)
defines ‘inequities in health’ as: “systematic and potentially
remediable differences in one or more aspects of health
across socially, economically, demographically, or geo-
graphically defined population groups or subgroups” [7],
page 140. Whitehead adds that ‘inequity’ refers to “differ-
ences which are unnecessary and avoidable but, in
addition, are also considered unfair and unjust” [8]. Think-
ing about ‘equity in health for all people worldwide’ there-
fore requires thinking about potential remedies for global
health inequalities, and thinking about which of these
remedies are required to advance justice and fairness: thus
global health requires a normative starting point about
what states ought to do across state borders. But there is
no widely accepted answer to the question about what
states ought to do to improve the health of people living
in other states. Global health researchers who are focused
on empirical research therefore need a dialogue with
global health researchers who work on that normative
question.
Likewise, global health researchers who focus on norma-
tive global health issues rely on empirical research. Even
the most compelling legal or moral argument for identify-
ing global health inequalities as global health inequities – as
inequalities that are potentially remediable and unjust –
requires guidance from empirical research on potential
remedies. If, for example, there were no empirical evidence
of international assistance improving the health of the
people living in countries receiving international assistance,
then the argument for international assistance – as a rem-
edy against global health inequalities – would fail.
Alternative normative starting points for international
and global health
Lencucha offers four alternative “ethical positions” for
foreign policy for health [9]:
 “Isolationism” – states have no responsibility
whatsoever to assist other states in improving health;
 “Charity” – states can help other states, if they
want, for as long as they want, and according to
their own priorities;
 “Security” – states should help other states address
health issues that are of common concern;
 “Cosmopolitanism” – humanity has a moral
responsibility towards humanity, and therefore states
should assist each other (or people should assist
each other, across borders, using states as
instruments).
Each of these ethical positions can be used as a normative
starting point for international or global health, and they
may lead to very different recommendations, regardless of
what the empirical evidence tells.
Adopting ‘isolationism’ as the normative starting point
for foreign policy for health would reduce the scope of
global health to old school international health: recom-
mendations should only consider the national situation
with regards to needs, means and priorities. That could,
for example, support the recommendation that low-
income countries should prioritize HIV prevention over
AIDS treatment [10], if it can be proven that HIV pre-
vention is indeed more efficient than AIDS treatment
and that many low-income countries cannot afford to do
both. ‘Isolationism’ could also support the recommenda-
tion that low-income countries should focus their efforts
to reduce maternal mortality on increasing skilled birth
attendance, rather than on trying to increase skilled
birth attendance and emergency obstetric care [11], if
increasing skilled birth attendance is within the country’s
means and emergency obstetric care is not.
Adopting ‘charity’ as the normative starting point for for-
eign policy for health may lead to a somewhat more gener-
ous form of international health. Again, recommendations
should first and foremost consider the national situation
with regards to needs, means and priorities. International
assistance can help poorer countries, but such assistance
would be a matter of charity, not a requirement of justice.
(I would therefore argue that if one uses ‘charity’ as the
normative starting point for foreign policy for health, one
should not consider global inequalities in health as global
inequities in health, because the potential remedy is not
required by justice – that is why I think this normative
starting point leads to a somewhat generous form of inter-
national health, rather than a form of global health.) On a
more practical level: both AIDS treatment and emergency
obstetric care in low-income countries could be recom-
mended, as long as one has enough confidence in the
depth of support of wealthier states for these issues (or
rather not recommended, if one distrusts the reliability of
charity-based aid).
If one adopts ‘security’ as the normative starting point
for foreign policy for health, one arrives at a particular
form of global health: not global health as defined by
Koplan and colleagues, but global health as Feldbaum and
Michaud describe it: “a means [used by countries] to
improve security, project power and influence, improve
their international image, or support other traditional
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foreign policy objectives” [12]. Under this form of global
health, AIDS treatment would be recommended, because
it would serve the interests of wealthier states to help
poorer states control the epidemic as tightly as possible,
while emergency obstetric care may not be recommended,
because maternal mortality does not constitute a cross-
border health security issue [13].
Under a ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to foreign policy for
health – or a right to health approach, which represents a
rather modest version of cosmopolitanism [14] – both
AIDS treatment and emergency obstetric care would be
recommended, because they save human lives, and wealth-
ier countries ought to assist countries unable to provide
these interventions.
There are alternative but similar grids of normative
starting points: Frenk and colleagues’ description of an
evolution in global health from “development aid” to
“international cooperation” to “global solidarity” [15] cor-
responds with Lencucha’s ‘charity’ , ‘security’ and ‘cosmo-
politanism’. Brown’s “four normative approaches to global
health” include “proximity”, “lifeboat ethics”, “utility”, and
“cosmopolitanism” [16]. Stuckler and McKee’s “five meta-
phors about global-health policy” are essentially five differ-
ent normative starting points for global health: “global
health as foreign policy”, “global health as security”, “glo-
bal health as charity”, “global health as investment”, and
“global health as public health” [17].
In this paper, I will use Lencucha’s grid, because it is easy
to understand yet sophisticated enough to serve my pur-
pose: to illustrate that different normative starting points
lead to different international or global health recommen-
dations, while most international or global health recom-
mendations that are based on empirical evidence do not
clarify the normative starting point adopted by the authors.
The other grids are mentioned to illustrate that there is no
widely accepted grid of normative starting points, let alone
a single widely accepted normative starting point, but also
to illustrate a different part of the problem. Lencucha’s
paper was published in BMC International Health &
Human Rights – a medical journal – as a ‘debate’ paper,
not a ‘research’ paper [9]. Frenk and colleagues’ paper [15]
and Stuckler and McKee’s paper [17] were published in The
Lancet – a medical journal – as a ‘viewpoint’ and a ‘com-
ment’ , not as ‘research’. Brown’s paper was published as a
‘research article’ in Global Policy [16] – not a medical jour-
nal. Opinion papers can be influential. But for most
researchers with a background in empirical disciplines, con-
clusions reported in opinion pages do not carry the same
weight as conclusions reported in research papers. ‘Truths’,
for most physicians, are found in research papers.
Dialogue
Several contemporary global health debates require a dia-
logue between global health researchers who are trained
in empirical disciplines and global health researchers who
are trained in normative disciplines. Lawyers and ethicists
are not trained to assess the impact of different public
health interventions and the inevitable uncertainties that
emerge from empirical studies. They need physicians and
epidemiologists to tell them what difference it makes to
provide HIV prevention alone or prevention and AIDS
treatment, or to provide skilled birth attendance alone or
skilled birth attendance and emergency obstetric care.
They need this information, for example, to be able to
illustrate the difference between the ‘charity’ , the ‘security’
and the ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches to foreign policy for
health. But if researchers with a background in empirical
disciplines omit some interventions from their research,
because they adopt (implicitly) the ‘charity’ approach to
foreign policy for health and prefer not to promote inter-
ventions that would rely on (unreliable) charity, then it
becomes impossible for global health researchers with a
background in normative disciplines to build their work
on the conclusions derived from empirical evidence. For
example, when Choulagai and colleagues conclude that
“Nepal’s health system must develop strategies that gener-
ate demand for [skilled birth attendance] services”, without
mentioning the option of providing emergency obstetric
care [18], it is not easy for a human rights lawyer like me to
understand why they did not consider emergency obstetric
care. Is it because they are convinced that emergency obstet-
ric care would not make a difference (would not reduce
health inequalities)? Or is it because they are convinced that
Nepal cannot afford to provide emergency obstetric care,
and that the international assistance that could allow Nepal
to provide emergency obstetric care will not be forthcoming?
Likewise, physicians and epidemiologists working in glo-
bal health need lawyers and philosophers to clarify the
consequences of the different normative starting points
for global health. It is tempting to work within the status
quo – to base recommendations on the assumption that
the resources available today will also be the resources
available tomorrow – but there is little empirical evidence
for that assumption and it is ethically and legally problem-
atic. According to Lencucha, the dominant normative
starting point in global health policy is the ‘security’ ap-
proach [9], which provides a plausible explanation for the
fact that we live in a world with a Global Fund to fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and no global fund to
fight maternal mortality [19]. If global health recommen-
dations are adjusted to that reality, and therefore more
ambitious when it comes to fighting AIDS than when it
comes to fighting maternal mortality, those recommenda-
tions tend to confirm the status quo, and reaffirm the
dominant normative starting point.
However, if global health researchers with a background
in empirical disciplines want to use a normative starting
point that departs from the status quo, they will want a
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normative starting point that is based on rigorous research.
If global health researchers with a background in norma-
tive disciplines want to provide guidance, they could
present their findings in ways that help their colleagues to
distinguish between merely personal opinion and profes-
sional opinion, the outcome of rigorous research.
Discussion
What would it take to improve the dialogue between
global health researchers who are trained in empirical
disciplines and global health researchers who are trained
in normative disciplines? In the background section, I
argued that there are two sides to the problem:
 Global health researchers with a background in
empirical disciplines seem reluctant to clarify the
normative starting point they use;
 Global health researchers with a background in
normative disciplines usually present their work in
ways that do not help their colleagues with a
background in empirical disciplines to distinguish
between merely personal opinion and the results of
rigorous research.
Before I try to explain why this is happening, and before
I try to offer solutions, I should probably explain that I am
a human rights lawyer, working at the Institute of Tropical
Medicine in Antwerp (ITM), where most faculty members
are physicians: I belong to one of the ‘sides’.
Why are global health researchers with a background in
empirical disciplines reluctant to clarify the normative
starting point they use?
In their paper on “Evidence-based policy making in global
health”, in the journal Evidence-Based Medicine, Yamey
and Feachem use a graphic that shows how, over time,
“global health policies based on evidence” are replacing
“global health policies based on opinion or whim” [20].
This assessment will make most global health researchers
with a background in normative disciplines frown. Are
there any global health policy recommendations that are
based on evidence, but not on personal opinion? Surely, if
the evidence is strong, it must have influenced the opinion
of the researchers who are using it. Probably, Yamey and
Feachem wanted to distinguish ‘global health policy based
on merely opinion or whim’ from ‘global health policy
based on opinion based on evidence’. In any case, the di-
chotomy they use illustrates a conviction shared by many
scientists who are trained in empirical disciplines: that
there is something problematic about policy recommen-
dations based on personal opinion.
The current trend of evidence-based global health builds
on the earlier trend of evidence-based medicine or
evidence-based public health [21], which tries to move
away from public health “driven by crises, hot issues, and
the concerns of organized interest groups” [22]. Who
could disagree with moving away from the whims and
concerns of organized interest groups as the driving forces
of global health? But a normative starting point is essential
for any global health policy recommendation, and nor-
mative starting points cannot be derived directly from
empirical evidence, because of the ‘is-ought problem’ dis-
cussed above. Normative starting points can be more than
merely personal opinions (or whims): they can be found in
law or ethical principles and theories, or derived from
these through logical reasoning, but they cannot be empir-
ically proven. In trying to exclude the whims and concerns
of organized pressure groups from global health policy
making, and lumping well-reasoned normative opinions
together with whims, the trend of evidence-based global
health has discredited the explicit use of normative start-
ing points that are at the heart of global health.
An alternative or complementary explanation is that
present global health policies are very different from the
ones that are required by the normative starting point
that most global health researchers support. Returning
to Lencucha’s grid [9], ‘isolationism’ is contradictory to
the very idea of global health. Not many global health
researchers support ‘charity’ as the appropriate norma-
tive starting point for global health: even if the use of
expressions like ‘donors and recipients’ or ‘sustainability’
(narrowly defined as ‘capacity to endure without external
assistance’) reflects an acceptance of the reality that
much international assistance is, at present, essentially
charity, that does not mean that the researchers who use
these expressions agree that global health ought to be
based on charity. Likewise, references to common inter-
ests or advantages expected to result from improved
global health – economic growth in developing coun-
tries from which all countries would benefit, infectious
disease control, or other ‘global public goods’ – seem to
be used more often by global health researches who
think these arguments will appeal to politicians, not by
global health researchers who agree that these argu-
ments ought to be the driving forces of global health.
Most global health researchers probably favor global
health based on ‘cosmopolitanism’. But a cosmopolitan
approach to global health is far more demanding than
the global health policies we have at present. This creates
a dilemma for many global health researchers: should they
recommend policies based on the normative starting point
they support themselves (together with the empirical evi-
dence they found), knowing that these recommendations
will probably not become reality, because global health
policy makers use a different normative starting point, or
should they recommended policies that are far below the
standard they would consider as appropriate themselves,
but still better than present policies, and more likely to be
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implemented? Some global health researchers avoid this
dilemma by formulating two options, like Costello and
colleagues do when they argue that “[g]overnments need
to be held accountable for the comprehensive provision of
facility-based midwifery and obstetrical care, which should
be a key component of any national safer motherhood
strategy”, yet add that “[i]t is naive, though, to assume that
this strategy is realistic in all contexts for the next decade”,
and conclude by recommending improved skilled birth
attendance (not necessarily facility-based, and therefore
not necessarily including emergency obstetric care) as the
non-ideal but feasible policy [11]. A two-tier recommen-
dation like this, however, is rather unusual, because
researchers are understandably reluctant about ‘under-
mining’ the recommendation they are making by admitting
they would personally support something else, something
better.
Why are global health researchers with a background in
normative disciplines not presenting their work in ways
that help their colleagues with a background in empirical
disciplines distinguish between merely personal opinion
and the results of rigorous research?
There is no dearth of rigorous research into the normative
foundations of global health. In recent years, the norma-
tive foundations of global health have been explored in
monographs by lawyers (Gostin [23], Tobin [24], Murphy
[25]) and philosophers (Wolff [26], Venkatapuram [27]),
and in many papers and book chapters. But it is hard to
find a paper on the issue that has been published as
‘original research’ in a medical journal. Why?
First, and perhaps foremost, most researchers with a
background in normative disciplines would probably
question the dichotomy between ‘personal opinion’ and
‘results of rigorous research’. When rigorous research
yields given outcomes, those outcomes will influence the
opinion of the researcher. Normative researchers may dis-
like the outcome of some of their research – for example,
that international intellectual property law forces govern-
ments to pay prices for some medicines that these govern-
ments can hardly afford to pay – but their finding that
there is something problematic about international intel-
lectual property law becomes part of their opinion too.
Lawyers have a solution for this tension: if necessary they
distinguish between ‘lex lata’ opinions and ‘lex ferenda’
opinions – ‘lex lata’ opinions are in accordance with
present law, ‘lex ferenda’ opinions are in accordance with
the law as they think it should be. They then have a two-
tier opinion, based on their research: according to the law,
something ought to happen; according to certain princi-
ples, something else ought to happen (and the law ought
to be changed). Furthermore, researchers with a back-
ground in normative disciplines accept that no normative
statement can be based on empirical evidence only. For
researchers with a background in normative disciplines,
what matters is the difference between properly and im-
properly researched and argued personal opinions.
Second, there is the issue of the length of papers medical
journals accept as research papers. To give a few exam-
ples: The Lancet advises authors to keep research papers
below 3,000 words; for Human Rights Quarterly, papers
should average between 5,000 and 10,000 words in length,
and the editors of Ethics prefer original research articles to
be between 5,000 and 12,000 words. This is not because
lawyers and philosophers like to write long papers, but be-
cause it is difficult to summarize normative research in less
than 5,000 words. Whereas the outcomes of a randomized
controlled trial can be summarized in a table – containing
symbols like degrees of fever, weeks of treatment, positive
or negative for outcomes – the ‘findings’ used in normative
research – legal texts, ethical principles – have to be
spelled out and explained carefully if the researcher wants
to avoid distorting them. If ‘fever’ means more or less the
same thing for most people, ‘fairness’ does not. When glo-
bal health researchers with a background in normative dis-
ciplines try to write a paper of less than 3,000 words, it will
often be a paper in which they only develop the arguments
that support their personal opinion, because there is no
space for arguments supporting an alternative opinion –
and it will look like an improperly researched and argued
personal opinion.
Third, there is the issue related to the structure of pa-
pers. Since the 1980s, the ‘introduction, methods, results,
and discussion’ (IMRAD) structure is “the only pattern
adopted in original papers” in leading medical journals
[28]. In Wu’s words:
 In the Background section, the researcher should
answer the question “Why did you do it in the
first place?”
 In the Methods section, the researcher should
answer the question “How did you do it exactly?”
 In the Results section, the researcher should answer
the question “What did you find?”
 In the Discussion section, the researcher should
answer the question “What does it mean after all
and so what?” [29].
For normative research, it makes little sense to disentangle
these questions. It is difficult to explain why one investigated
a normative issue without explaining the meaning of the
issue; the common method is logic and sound reasoning and
it is applied throughout the research, and ‘results’ will only
be considered as such if they are meaningful. Therefore the
same arguments have to be developed – and repeated – in
several sections, which would make the paper even longer.
Last but not least, when global health researchers with
a background in normative sciences try to conform to
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medical journal standards – the length, the IMRAD
structure – they will often find that their paper is re-
fused as a research paper but accepted as an opinion
paper. This has happened to me and my colleagues nu-
merous times. For a paper that was recently published
by BMC International Health and Human Rights, we
used the IMRAD structure and tried to keep the length
below 4,000 words – provoking a comment by one of
the reviewers, a philosopher, that is was a very short
paper – but it was refused as a research paper and ac-
cepted as an opinion paper [30]. The editors argued that
they did not have a standard allowing them to distin-
guish this paper from a paper that represents (merely)
the personal opinion of the authors.
Can global health researchers with a background in
empirical disciplines be encouraged to clarify the
normative starting point they use?
As long as global health policies are divided into “global
health policies based on evidence” and “global health
policies based on opinion or whim” [20], it will be diffi-
cult to convince global health researchers with a back-
ground in empirical disciplines to be open about the
normative starting point they use. To some extent, nor-
mative starting points are inevitably based on personal
opinion, because they cannot be empirically proven, and
as long as ‘evidence-based global health’ ranks personal
opinion together with ‘whim’ , global health researchers
will refrain from explaining to what extent their recom-
mendations are based on their personal opinion with
regards to the normative starting point for global health.
However, a paper Hammonds and I wrote recently for
Tropical Medicine and International Health, on “Right
to health and global public health research” [19], seems
to have sparked a rather healthy – in my opinion –
debate among physicians (mostly) on the “Politics in
Global Health Policy” in the International Journal of
Health Policy and Management. Bruen and Brugha
argue that global health policies “are never politically
neutral” [31]; McCoy and Singh write that “[i]t seems
extraordinary that we need reminding of the fact that
policy-making is fundamentally political; and that there
is no such thing as a ‘neutral policy’” [32]; and Harmer
argues: “To research health policy is to research politics”
[33]. Researching politics without researching the norma-
tive starting points that underpin politics makes no sense. I
sincerely hope that debates like these will encourage global
health researchers with a background in empirical disci-
plines to clarify the normative starting point they are using.
I anticipate, however, that some of the global health
researchers with a background in empirical disciplines
will argue that there is an important difference between
describing the politics that underpin global health at
present, and expressing a normative opinion about those
politics. Some of them will argue that it is merely their
job to describe, not to prescribe. I would agree, but only
to a very limited extent: only for global health research
that remains empirical from the beginning to the end –
i.e., research that does not lead to any recommendation.
As soon as research serves as the basis for a recommenda-
tion, it should evaluate – i.e., to assess the value of – the
politics on which it is based, otherwise it confirms those
politics implicitly. As discussed above, using Lencucha’s
grid again [9], if one assumes that ‘security’ considerations
drive foreign policy for health (while believing that
‘cosmopolitan’ considerations ought to drive foreign policy
for health), and one therefore recommends global health
policy based on the assumptions that there will not be
enough reliable international assistance for more ambi-
tious maternal health policies (while there may be enough
reliable international assistance for more ambitious infec-
tious disease control policies) one will end up recom-
mending a combination of global health policies driven by
‘security’ considerations. Does it mean then that all global
health research should be based on an ‘appeal to faith’ – a
belief that a better world is possible – instead of an ‘appeal
to tradition’ , as Bruen and Brugha [31] summarized
Hammonds’ and my position [19]? There is a truism that
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and it means that one should not rec-
ommend policies that are not possible in the real world. If
one does not believe that global health policies driven by
‘cosmopolitan’ considerations are possible, one should in-
deed not recommend them, but then one should state that
one proposes global health policy based on ‘security’ or
perhaps ‘charity’ as the best possible global health policy
in the real world – allowing colleagues to understand how
the recommendations are colored by that normative start-
ing point.
To be sure, I am not asking all global health recommen-
dations to begin or end with extensive elaborations of the
normative starting point used by the researchers. A brief
reference to where one stands with regards to Lencucha’s
[9], Frenk and colleagues’ [15], Brown’s [16] or Stuckler
and McKee’s [17] grid would be sufficient to inform col-
leagues. Furthermore, as I explained above, I suspect that
the politics that underpin global health policy at present
are very distant from the normative starting point that
most global health researchers support, which creates a
tension between ‘policies for the real world’ and ‘policies
for the better world’. Here again, a simple acknowledge-
ment of alternative ‘policies for the better world’ would
suffice. I shall illustrate this, using a realm other than glo-
bal health policy. I respect policy recommendations that
try to eliminate hazardous child labor, and that are based
on the assumption that eliminating all child labor is not
possible in the short run, but think it is essential to
mention that eliminating all child labor remains the ultim-
ate goal. Likewise, I appreciate Costello and colleagues’
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comment that “[g]overnments need to be held account-
able for the comprehensive provision of facility-based
midwifery and obstetrical care” and their acknowledgment
that their recommendations are based on the assumption
that this strategy is not “realistic in all contexts for the
next decade” [11]: that allows me, a human right lawyer
working in global health, to understand that their recom-
mendations are not ambitious enough to realize the right
to health. It also allows me to understand that the “Tech-
nical guidance on the application of a human rights-based
approach to the implementation of policies and pro-
grammes to reduce preventable maternal morbidity and
mortality” issued by Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights [34] – containing more
ambitious recommendations than the ones formulated by
Costello and colleagues – are based on a different norma-
tive starting point, not necessarily on different empirical
evidence. It would be extremely useful if all global health
researchers who are trained in empirical disciplines would
offer similar clarifications.
Can global health researchers with a background in
normative disciplines be encouraged to present their
work in ways that help their colleagues with a
background in empirical disciplines to distinguish
between (merely) personal opinions and the results of
rigorous research?
I suspect that many of my colleague global health
researchers with a background in normative disciplines
would like to engage in a dialogue with global health
researchers with a background in empirical disciplines.
But some of them will argue that if the interdisciplinary
nature of global health were well understood and
respected by all global health researchers – allowing re-
searchers from different disciplinary backgrounds to work
within their own paradigm [35] – they would not have to
adapt to the expectations of their colleagues with a back-
ground in empirical disciplines. The latter should accept
that if a paper is published as a research paper in a peer-
reviewed legal or philosophical journal, it is the result of
rigorous research, not merely personal opinion (or whim).
However, many of us have come to realize that in spite
of all the rhetorical support for interdisciplinary global
health research, it remains a challenge to cross the bound-
aries between normative and empirical disciplines. When
our colleagues with a background in empirical disciplines
look for knowledge – for ‘truths’ they can work with, that
can serve as a building block for additional research –
they usually look in research papers in medical journals.
When I discuss this with colleagues at the ITM, it
reminds them of the ‘wall’ that existed – and still exists, to
some extent – between quantitative and qualitative
research. Qualitative researchers felt or feel that “the rigid
requirements (i.e., word count) of medical journals and
reviewers’ attempts to “quanti-sise” qualitative research
(apply assumptions of the quantitative paradigm to quality
assessment) prohibit publication of their work” [36]. Like-
wise, some global health researchers with a background in
normative disciplines feel pressure to ‘empiricalize’ their
work, in order for it to be considered as ‘real’ research: the
empirical findings of interviews with experts about the
meaning of the right to health were published as a re-
search paper in this journal, BMC International Health
and Human Rights [37], the results of comparing the texts
of different norms were published as correspondence [30].
I do not want to argue that empirical research is useless
for normative issues, but one has to understand the limita-
tions. For example, interviewing hundreds of taxpayers of
countries providing international assistance about their
global health priorities – giving them the choice between
fighting Ebola through a ‘vertical’ program or supporting
health systems in low-income countries so they would be
able to control Ebola outbreaks – would provide useful in-
sights into the politics that drive global health policy but
not the answer the question about the politics that ought
to drive global health policy.
The solution identified for blending qualitative with
quantitative research may also improve the dialogue
between empirical and normative disciplines. This jour-
nal, like many other medical journals, uses Clark’s guide-
lines for reviewing qualitative research manuscripts [36].
These standards are known by the acronym RATS,
which stands for:
 Relevance of study question;
 Appropriateness of qualitative method;
 Transparency of procedures;
 Soundness of interpretive approach.
I think RATS could also be used as guidance for reviews
of papers reporting normative research – or normative
inquiries – even by reviewers who do not have a back-
ground in normative disciplines.
The relevance of a normative inquiry can be judged by
assessing the relevance of the global health policy issue
at stake, and by assessing whether different normative
starting points lie at the roots of different recommenda-
tions. For example, if some global health researchers argue
that in some circumstances public health agents should
focus on cancer prevention, while others recommend pro-
viding cancer treatment, then doubts about the effective-
ness of cancer treatment – based on inconclusive empirical
evidence – could lie at the root of the different recommen-
dations, and then a normative inquiry may again seem
rather irrelevant (empirical studies examining the effective-
ness of cancer treatment in different circumstances would
be more urgent). However, if recommendations differ
because researchers appear to use different normative
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starting points – about national and international responsi-
bilities for providing cancer treatment – a normative
inquiry would be relevant.
The appropriateness of a normative inquiry can be
judged by the selection and the justification of the
arguments that are considered and compared. Are the
arguments relevant for the issue? Have all the relevant
arguments been considered and justified?
The transparency of a normative inquiry can be judged
by the criteria researchers used to consider or omit
arguments, and whether these criteria are explicitly
mentioned. For example, if a normative inquiry considers
only arguments developed by philosophers known as
‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers, omits the arguments of philoso-
phers who favor more state-centered interpretations of
global justice, and does not explain why the arguments of
philosophers who favor more state-centered interpreta-
tions of global justice were not considered, the results are
probably misleading the readers.
Finally, even a normative inquiry that is relevant,
appropriate and transparent, should still be assessed for
its interpretative soundness. For example, a normative
inquiry that focuses on national and global disparities in
under five mortality [38], may lead to the conclusion
that both the national and the global inequalities observed
should be considered as inequities, i.e. inequalities that are
remediable, unfair and unjust. But if it were followed
directly by a recommendation that all states of the world
pool all their public resources for health, to allocate them
in the most cost-effective way to maximize the health of
humanity, that would – in my opinion – lack interpret-
ative soundness. Such a recommendation could serve as a
light house for incremental changes, but not as a founda-
tion for global health policy in the immediate future.
I am aware that the summary transposition of RATS
guidelines to normative research that I am offering here
does not do justice to their richness. Any attempt to for-
mulate comprehensive RATS-like guidelines for normative
research would, at present, be haughty. Clark developed
RATS using existing guidelines for preparing qualitative
research projects, critical evaluations of qualitative re-
search papers done by others, and her own professional
experience [36]. I think that a consultation involving
global health researchers from different disciplines and
editors of medical journals would be required to de-
velop RATS-like guidelines, appropriate for normative
research. The global health dialogue I have in mind
needs to start with a dialogue about what it takes to
understand each other.
Finally, I am not arguing that all papers or books about
normative issues that are relevant for global health policy
ought to be written in line with RATS-like guidelines. The
above-mentioned argument about the interdisciplinary
nature of global health research – which should allow
researchers from different disciplines to work and report
within their own paradigm – remains valid, in my opinion.
I am only proposing a solution for global health researchers
with a background in normative disciplines who want to
make it easier for their colleagues with a background in
empirical disciplines to see the difference between (merely)
personal opinions and the results of rigorous research.
Summary
If global health research wants to achieve the goal of
“achieving equity in health for all people worldwide” [2], it
needs to build on ‘truths’ from empirical and normative
disciplines, and these are ‘truths’ of different epistemo-
logical natures. If only to explain what ‘equity in health for
all people worldwide’ means, a normative starting point is
needed.
A single common paradigm for all disciplines that
contribute to global health may not be possible, perhaps
not even desirable at present. The gap between present
realities in global health policy and the normative starting
position that most global health researchers support is
such that an attempt to bridge it could lead to either
unrealistic or unfair policy recommendations. However, a
better dialogue between global health researchers with a
background in empirical disciplines and global health re-
searchers with a background in normative disciplines
could help to identify incremental steps towards ‘equity in
health for all people worldwide’ – towards global health.
Global health researchers with a background in empir-
ical sciences could relatively easily declare the normative
starting point on which their recommendations are built,
and explain whether they personally agree with that
starting point or if they rather reluctantly accept it as
the current reality. That would allow global health
researchers with a background in normative sciences to
distinguish between a recommendation that is based on
the acceptance of the present politics of global health and
a recommendation that represents what the researchers
who formulated the recommendation truly believe to be
the right recommendation – the one that ought to be
implemented to achieve ‘equity in health for all people
worldwide’.
Global health researchers with a background in norma-
tive disciplines could present their findings in ways that
would help global health researchers with a background in
empirical disciplines to distinguish between what is merely
a personal opinion and what is the result of rigorous nor-
mative research. Guidelines that are similar to the RATS
guidelines, developed to review qualitative research, could
be adapted for reporting normative inquiries. Achieving
this will require a consultation involving global health
researchers from different disciplines and editors of
medical journals.
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